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Interface Between Trade Law and Competition Law in the
North American Context
by Douglas Rosenthal*
There is a surprising paucity of careful analysis of the interrelationship
between competition and trade law. There is a great deal of analysis
relating to competition policies and free trade versus protectionism, but
how can and should competition and trade law interrelate?
Almost no American analysis has focused on that interrelationship,
except at a very superficial level. I would suggest to you that there are
three views which can be found, none of them very carefully articulated.
The first view is reflected in a case some 20 years ago that involved im-
ported shoes from Southeast Asia, the so-called sneaker circus case.
There was trade relief provided under the trade laws which led inevita-
bly, as trade relief often does, to escape clause relief: safeguard trade
relief, which led to joint action. The argument was made that under the
Sherman Act-as the Magna Carta of economic liberty and all of the
other rhetoric, the quasi constitutional status that all of you are exces-
sively familiar, and excessively skeptical about-the trade laws are to be
narrowly construed as exceptions to the antitrust laws.
That is an antitrust lawyer's view of the trade law. It is an overly
optimistic view by antitrust lawyers. Congress did not intend the trade
law to be a minor exception to the Sherman Act, but nonetheless that is a
view reflected in the answer in the sneaker circus case.
The second view is that the Sherman Act has nothing to do with
trade policy. In fact, when important matters of trade policy are on the
table, the antitrust laws and the antitrust enforcers should go quietly
away and leave the diplomats to do their work in the International Trade
Commission and the Commerce Department. That view is reflected in
the position taken by the State Department in the Consumers Union liti-
gation. That position was that the President had considerable authority
to enter into trade agreements under his foreign policy power and that
the antitrust laws were not intended by Congress to cut back that power,
at least not constitutionally. Notwithstanding that the antitrust laws reg-
ulate commerce under the legislative competence of the Congress, they
could not cut back the powers. That view seems to be somewhat paro-
chial and is a view that is taken robustly only at one's hazard.
The third view, which I would like to explore and which is implied
in what others have said, is that it should be an aspiration of legislators,
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law enforcers, and executive policy makers to seek to rationalize and har-
monize the two bodies of law as much as possible. This was, indeed, a
goal of the negotiators after the Second World War in their bold attempt
at a new international economic order, and in their attempt to involve
antitrust as part of the new international economic order of which the
GATT was the keystone of the framework.
There is now more consensus than ever among informed business-
men, scholars, government officials, and professionals in both the United
States and Canada that the competition fostered by law and policy
should be the ultimate goal of international economic commerce and
trade. The protectionism reflected in trade law is a necessary accommo-
dation, but not the principal goal. It is a necessary accommodation to
avoid perceived unfairness. It is necessary as a safety valve for undenia-
ble social and political pressures which build up in times of national eco-
nomic difficulty and in times of general prosperity, where there are
individual distressed economic sectors.
One would have expected U.S. antitrust enforcers and free trade
academics to promote this goal of rationalization in which the commit-
ment to competition is more enduring than an expansive regime of trade
protection. One would have particularly expected it in the Reagan Ad-
ministration, which purports to be committed to free trade. This should
be especially expected from antitrust officials in that administration who
have been weaned on the mother's milk of Chicago School economics.
To some extent, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) under Jim
Miller and Dan Oliver deserve some praise for speaking out on competi-
tion policy issues, such as in the softwood lumber case. But the antitrust
division has been disappointingly silent, and the FTC does not act well
enough or often enough on a number of major challenges to competition
law, nor on addressing competition policy.
The Canadian government is offering the United States a bold and
important opportunity to further this third approach to rationalizing
trade and antitrust. I am willing to tread where officials, and those who
are probably more prudent, are reluctant to do so, and begin to take on
Calvin Goldman's third question; because I do think that it is more than
just abstractly possible. The development of a legal regime should be
feasible within the next few years, if we really attend to it; a legal regime
where there would be no need for dumping or safeguard or unfair trade
practice laws between the United States and Canada. Trade between
those two nations, and the long-term fundamental goals reflected in the
trade laws, could be protected by competition laws, by patent and intel-
lectual property laws. In the case of piracy, which is one of the concerns
that supposedly justifies the new trade legislation, the trade could be pro-
tected through laws against piracy and fraud and deceptive practices.
As we are hearing again today, Canada is willing to meet the U.S.
concerns about a level playing field. They are willing to negotiate to
open up Canadian markets to U.S. goods on an equal footing, to offer the
Vol. 12:107 1987
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very things which the sponsors of current U.S. protectionist trade legisla-
tion say they are seeking as the goals of such legislation. That is perhaps
the answer to Carl Beigie's question, "What is in it for the United
States?"
There are two things in a free trade agreement with Canada for the
United States, particularly in the context of open markets. First, the
United States, through the Reagan and Carter Administrations, has basi-
cally justified protectionist action on the grounds that other nations are
not letting us play on a level playing field.
We have repeatedly said that if they allow us into their markets on a
free and open basis, we do not need to apply these laws. We are ready,
willing and able to compete with anybody who is willing to let us com-
pete. The problem is that these other nations are not willing to let us
compete. Here Canada is offering to the United States a chance to come
in and do the very thing that the United States says is the justification for
putting an end to the enforcement of trade laws.
The United States can not accept that challenge without opening
itself up to serious criticism that all of this rhetoric about level playing
fields is hypocrisy and is a cover for the basic fact that the United States
is afraid of competition.
Second, I see something symbolic and important which follows in
the U.S. tradition of having a frontier. This may impress some Canadi-
ans as patronizing, but I don't mean it as such. For Americans it is very
important to believe that there are frontiers, to believe that there are new
markets and new opportunities; and even though the Canadian market is
one-tenth of the U.S. market, Canada's rich, plentiful resources in a
number of areas are significantly greater than one-tenth of the resources
that the United States has.
It strikes at a cord in the American imagination-and obviously this
is a literary point which I cannot prove-but it seems to me that it strikes
at a responsive cord which has historical roots in the American imagina-
tion to see the potentialities of a partnership with the Canadian people,
who are land rich and resource rich and a highly-skilled work force, but
have not populated their land as fully as the United States has populated
itself. That in itself, that goal, the ideal of what this North American,
this enormous North American market, geographically can do, could
have a tremendous energizing impact in the United States, as well as in
Canada, and could restore the sense that many of us have that we are
capable of competing, for example, with the Japanese and the others in
the ASEAN League.
You will see, in the published conference proceedings, a paper that
Lawson Hunter and I jointly authored, and from which much of Law-
son's presentation was taken. We do offer the proposition that the dump-
ing laws could be abandoned in favor of predation and attempt to
monopolize in the United States and the Robinson-Patman Act. I don't
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see any basic need to change either pieces of legislation in the United
States and I think it will be difficult to get major legislative change in the
United States.
The change may be required in Canada, as Lawson indicated, to
provide for primary line discrimination suits and a meeting-competition
defense, which I think are more economically rational as substitutes for
the antidumping laws. I would like to go still one step further and sug-
gest that not even the problems of precedure need be insurmountable,
although clearly they are difficult.
There are various ways in which U.S. antitrust law is more aggres-
sive and the procedure would be very difficult for Canadians to accept.
Let me offer this as a thought. What if we had a trade treaty provide for
a choice of law; a choice of forum analysis to be applied by either a U.S.
or a Canadian court; and provide that the principles to be applied under
this choice of law, choice of forum analysis, are the principles used in
choice of law today in both jurisdictions.
The jurisdiction which had the predominant context would be the
forum jurisdiction for hearing and resolving the trade dispute and its law
would be applied. That means that if Canada had the predominant con-
text, the treble damage remedy would not be applicable. The problems
of a private suite might be sufficient to frustrate most challenges, but in
the United States, if the United States had the predominant context, U.S.
law procedurally would proceed as it is today. The point being, the Ca-
nadian firms that are substantially engaged in commerce in the United
States have shown themselves very able to compete with American firms
knowing how to do business under the U.S. legal regime, including the
U.S. antitrust regime.
The basic problems between Canada and the United States in the
antitrust area are cases where the Canadin government had an official
governmental policy directly in conflict with U.S. antitrust enforcement.
The issue was that the United States, from Canada's view, was failing to
respect the elementary principle of international law, the principle of the
sovereign equality of states, and was unwilling to give sufficient regard to
Canada's sovereign right to control conduct within Canadian territory.
I have always felt, and this is a parenthetical observation, that for
Canada to help educate Americans about what is offensive to Canada
about U.S. antitrust laws, maybe it should consider amendments to Ca-
nadian antitrust laws. It strikes me, that if you had extraterritorial anti-
trust jurisdiction and if the U.S. Congress was to reimpose a uranium
import embargo in the future, Canada might bring an antitrust action
against those American companies which had induced the Congress to
pass the legislation imposing that embargo.
That, of course, is what the U.S. government did in 1920 when it
brought the size and sales case against Americans who lobbied the Mexi-
can and Yucatan legislatures to give a size monopoly to people in Mex-
Vol. 12:107 1987
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ico. If American companies were hauled into Canadian courts and
subjected to treble damages for lobbying the American Congress, there
would be screams of outrage about American sovereignty and the United
States would begin to understand what Canada was concerned about.
Frankly, since the Canadian import embargo was a blatantly anticompe-
titive act, it seems to me that if you could ignore what we would call the
Nora Paddington (sic) defense, it seems that you are on very sound anti-
trust grounds in proceeding with such a prosecution.
The most difficult problems will be in coordinating on trade
problems vis-a-vis the outside world. If we do have free trade regime
between Canada and United States, we don't want Canada being too lib-
eral in allowing imports which violate our standards of fairness. Then
the goods could come through Canada and flood into the United States.
Neither do we want one nation to be out ahead of the other, if it is at all
possible, in how aggressively it is trying to promote its own exports in
foreign markets by challenging various trade practices of other nations.
Those are things, it seems, that bear a great deal of thought.
As to the problem with dislocation; given deregulation in transpor-
tation in North America, as is increasingly happening, and given the in-
creasing geographic expansion of markets in North America, as is
increasingly happening, and given the increasing geographic expansion of
markets in North America, it strikes me that it is going to be very, very
difficult for there to be effective dumping with any significant dumping
margin between two different markets: the United States and Canada. I
also think it's pretty difficult today for any serious kind of effective price
discrimination between one part of the American market and another
part of the American market.
Resales back into the market, if the price differential is too great,
will be a better cure for the dumping and the price discrimination than
legal action. I'm skeptical of Lawson Hunter's concern that Canadian
industry will be subjected to a great deal of bashing by American compa-
nies frustrated because they can't bring dumping actions and inclined to
bring price discrimination or predation actions.
Lawson gave you the batting average in those actions in recent
years. They are not very good. Litigation is very expensive in our fed-
eral courts, as well as in the Commerce Department and the Interna-
tional Trade Commission. While there may be some risk of it, it strikes
me that complaining about that as a risk is like complaining or worrying
about getting somebody to stop hitting you on the head with a baseball
bat and worrying that they are going to start hitting you on the behind
with a baseball bat. Of the two kinds of bashing, those involved in the
enormous industry-wide dumping cases are far more costly and far more
troublesome than these ad hoc price discrimination cases would be.
My final point is that I'm genuinely concerned about the behavior of
my colleagues in antitrust, in the official antitrust agencies in the United
States today. I don't know why they are not seizing the initiative, both
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within the administration and to the extent they can-and Dan Oliver
can to a considerable extent-outside the administration, why they are
not pushing for this free trade agreement and for antitrust trade rational-
ization as a great step forward in implementing Chicago School Econom-
ics. I'm particularly puzzled by this problem in the Reagan
Administration, because the antitrust officials involved and others in the
Reagan Administration have praised themselves up, down, and sideways
on their fidelity to Chicago School principles; and yet here is Canada,
providing a ready-made opportunity to try to take a giant stept forward
in implementing those principles, in a relatively safe way, in the interna-
tional trade environment and the administration still hesitates.
It is nonsense for the United States to say, to seriously believe, and
for the antitrust officials to stand-by while they say, that we will not con-
sider modifications of U.S. trade law in negotiating a free trade agree-
ment with Canada. Then again there are lot of things today that are
troubling to somebody who is committed to antitrust and to competition.
I'm troubled, for example, by the way the Secretary of Commerce and
the Secretary of Defense are able to stop a potential acquisition by a Jap-
anese company of an American microchip subsidiary of a French com-
pany, not because it is a violation of the antitrust laws, which it's not, not
under the Defense Production Act, which is the only legal alternative to
the application of the antitrust laws that I'm aware of on national secur-
ity grounds, but because the government feels that something needs to be
done to show that we are tough in the fight with Japan on the Japanese
semiconductor case.
Where was the antitrust division when this issue was being run to
ground so effectively by Baldridge and Weinberger? In 1982 Baldridge
and Weinberger tried to torpedo the break up of AT&T and the then
head of the antitrust division, Bill Baxter, was extremely effective in mak-
ing sure they were unable to do so. I notice that now, six years later, the
Defense Department is still able to let bids for a new sophisticated de-
fense communication system which will probably meet all of its needs
and be obtained at a considerably cheaper price than if the only negotia-
tion could have been held with AT&T.
I don't understand why this administration is supporting new legis-
lation, S-752, which seems to be consistent with the Administration's
view that the active state and foreign compulsion defenses are no de-
fenses to actions brought by the U.S. government. They are only de-
fenses to actions brought in private cases. I'm concerned because that
legislation specifically says that foreign relations considerations are not to
be taken into account by courts.
I can understand that a foreign relation consideration could be that
we want to have good relations with Mexico, and at the moment our
relations with Mexico are a little uneasy, so we ought to go in and dis-
miss an antitrust action against the American subsidiary of a Mexican
parent. That kind of an argument ought to have no place in the applica-
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tion of the antitrust laws. I question whether the government can be
trusted to act in the public interest.
If that argument were made by a Democratic administration, I
would submit to you that the conservative Republicans would say, here's
another example of that reckless, big-spending, government-can-solve-
all-problems mentality. For the Reagan Administration to say that I'm
from the government, I'm here to help you and, therefore, trust me and
don't subject me to the same standards of fairness and constitutional re-
view that you would subject private parties, I find remarkable.
In sum, I'm excited by a vision of what can happen for both the
United States and Canada with a free trade zone. I can't think of a better
spur to innovation, entrepreneurship, investment and net employment in
both nations. I think the Chicago School is basically correct, though
they have no monopoly on this insight, that competition spurs economic
growth and development.
I'm afraid that if we lose this opportunity, it will be lost for many
more years and we will all be the poorer. I hope that in the next months,
my former U.S. antitrust enforcement colleagues will appreciate this op-
portunity and start working to bring it to success. Thank you very
much.
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